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Racial Discrimination: The Decline and
Fall of California's Proposition 14
by Peter J. Donnici*
IN NOVEMBER of 1964, after a bitter and heated campaign, the voters of
California adopted Proposition 14 by an overwhelming two-to-one ma-
jority. Proposition 14, which became Article I, Section 26 of the California
Constitution, provided in part:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny,
limit, or abridge, directly or indirectly the right of any person, who is
willing or desirous to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real prop-
erty, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such persons as he,
in his absolute discretion, chooses.
On May 10, 1966 the California Supreme Court handed down its
decisions in seven cases invalidating Article I, Section 26 as a violation
of equal protection of laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution. Six of these cases' (the leading one of
which was Mulkey v. Reitman) had concerned Negroes who were refused
rental of, or evicted from, premises on the basis of racial considerations.
The seventh case 2 was a petition for a writ of mandate challenging the
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[Although the author participated as counsel in a brief challenging the constitutionality
of Proposition 14, this article is written as an attempt to objectively appraise problems of
state responsibility for residential discrimination.]
1 Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Adv.Cal. 557, 50 Cal.Rptr. 881 (1966); Grogan v. Meyer, 64
Adv.Cal. 589, 50 Cal.Rptr. 901 (1966) ; Prendergast v. Snyder, 64 Adv.Cal. 591, 50 Cal.Rptr.
903 (1966); Peyton v. Barrington Plaza Corp., 64 Adv.Cal. 594, 50 Cal.Rptr. 905 (1966);
Hill v. Miller, 64 Adv.Cal. 598, 50 Cal.Rptr. 908 (1966); Thomas v. Goulis, 64 Adv.Cal. 601,
50 Cal.Rptr. 910 (1966). See also: Hill v. Miller, 64 Adv.Cal. 819, 51 Cal.Rptr. 689 (1966).
Prior to the enactment of Proposition 14, the California Supreme Court rejected a petition for
mandamus to keep the measure off the ballot. The Court felt "that it would be more appro-
priate to pass on (the constitutional) questions after the election." Lewis v. Jordan, Sac. 7549
(June 3, 1964). There the Court recognized that Proposition 14 presented "grave questions
... under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution," but chose not to
interfere, at that point, with the power of the people to propose laws and amendments and
to adopt or reject such proposals at the polls.
2 Redevelopment Agency of the City of Fresno v. Buckman, 64 Adv.Cal. 603, 50 Cal.Rptr.
912 (1966).
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constitutionality of Section 26, as applied to property involved in com-
munity redevelopment and urban renewal.
In each of the cases, several grounds were urged in opposition to the
amendment's validity. It was claimed that Article I, Section 26 was
invalid because as an initiative measure it wrongfully related to more
than one subject.8 Moreover, opponents alleged that the provision was a
revision' of (rather than an amendment to) the State Constitution.5 Addi-
tional issues were raised as to the provision's repugnance to existing
federal statutes.6
But it was clearly recognized by all parties concerned that the most
significant question presented for decision was the validity of Section 26
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This
was an issue of national, as well as state importance, and the one to
which this study will be addressed. Hopefully, from the discussion some
insight will be gained regarding the role of the Fourteenth Amendment
as a limitation on residential racial discrimination.
THE PURPOSE OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi-
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws.7
When construing the passages of the Fourteenth Amendment for the
first time, the United States Supreme Court emphasized that the primary
purposes of the provision were to confer citizenship upon the recently
3 If true, such would violate the requirements of Article IV, Section I(c) of the California
Constitution:
Every constitutional amendment or statute proposed by the initiative shall relate to but one subject.
No such amendment or statute shall hereafter be submitted to the electors if it embraces more than
one subject, nor shall any such amendment or statute embracing more than one subject, hereafter
submitted to or approved by the electors, become effective for any purpose.
4 Opponents of Article I, Section 26 assert that it "revises" Article I, Section 1 (which
guarantees the right of all persons to acquire, possess and protect real property), Article I,
Section 11 (requiring all laws of a general nature to have uniform application) and Article I,
Section 21 (prohibiting class legislation).
5 Article XVIII of the California Constitution.
6 42 U.S.C. §1982 provides that:
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right in every state and territory, as is en-
joyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal
property.
See also, Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). The Civil Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. §242
makes it a-crime for anyone
who under color of any law . " or custom subjects any inhabitant . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States
... by rea-on of his color or race.
7 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1.
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emancipated members of the Negro race and to prevent the states from
discriminatory treatment of them." Protection from racial discrimination
was the specific function of the equal protection clause:
In light of the history of these amendments, and the pervading purpose
of them,. . . it is not difficult to give a meaning to this [equal protec-
tion] clause. The existence of laws in the states where the newly emanci-
pated Negroes resided, which discriminated with gross injustice and
hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be remedied by this
clause, and by it such laws are forbiddenY
Most recently, former Justice Goldberg, concurring in Bell v. Mary-
land,1" has stated:
The Court has traditionally applied this constitutional standard [of
racial equality] to give real meaning to the equal protection clause as
the revelation of an enduring constitutional purpose."
STATE ACTION OR PRIVATE ACTION: THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION
IN THE SEARCH FOR RESPONSIBILITY
It is clear from the wording of the Fourteenth Amendment that the
provision purports to limit only that invidiously discriminatory treatment
in which the state is responsibly involved. This "state action" require-
ment has traditionally been included in the Supreme Court's interpreta-
tion of the clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment:
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the
Amendment. It has a deeper and broader scope. It nullifies and makes
void all state legislation, and state action of every kind, which impairs
the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, or which
injures them in life, liberty or property, without due process of law or
denies to any of them equal protection of the laws.'2 [Emphasis added]
In the course of its opinion in the landmark Civil Rights Cases,3 the
8 Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36 (1872).
9 Id. at 81.10378 U.S. 226 (1963).
11 Id. at 286, 287.
12 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
13 Ibid.
Recently, in United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. - (1966), a majority of the members of
the Supreme Court rejected that portion of the Civil Rights Cases which held that con-
spiracies by private individuals to deprive other individuals of Fourteenth Amendment rights
were not covered by §241 of the Civil Rights Act. Nevertheless, some state involvement (e.g.,
private individuals preventing the use of public facilities) remains necessary for defining or
creating a federal right secured by the Fourteenth Amendment. In a concurring opinion
(joined by Chief Justice Warren and Mr. Justice Douglas) Mr. Justice Brennan stated:
For me, the right to use state facilities without discrimination on the basis of race is, within the
meaning of §241, a right created by, arising under and dependent upon the Fourteenth Amendment
and hence is a right 'secured' by that Amendment....
A majority of the members of the Court express the view today that §5 empowers Congress to
enact laws punishing all conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of Fourteenth Amendment rights
whether or not state officers . . . are implicated in the conspiracy.
[Vol. I
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Supreme Court explained the reasoning behind the state action concept:
The wrongful act of an [private] individual, unsupported by any such
[state] authority, is simply a private wrong .... If not sanctioned in
some way by the state, or not done under state authority, his rights
remain in full force and may presumably be vindicated by resort to the
laws of the state for redress.14
Under this rationale, the Court pointed out, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment would also prohibit wrongful or discriminatory acts committed
by private individuals and supported "by state authority in the shape
of laws, customs or judicial or executive proceedings."' 5
It is obvious that the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection
clause nullifies state or local governmental regulations which compel racial
discrimination or segregation of private, 6 as well as public 7 facilities.
But these cases are of little help to us in evaluating Article I, Section 26
which is free of any language compelling discriminatory residential
practices. Indeed, proponents of Section 26 were quick to point out that
the provision did nothing more than grant the owner of property the
right to sell or lease to whomever he chose. If, in the exercise of this
power, the owner engaged in racial discrimination, then such was merely
a private act of discrimination, not state action within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Any meaningful evaluation of California's new constitutional provi-
sion must focus on a consideration of the concept of state action. Cali-
fornia's adoption of Section 26 clearly constitutes official "state action."
The more important question, however, is whether the provision placed
upon the state some responsibility for the private acts of racial discrimi-
nation which subsequently occurred. 8 Did Article I, Section 26 merely
articulate a neutral state position on the subject of private residential
racial discrimination? If so, the discrimination which followed was prin-
cipally of a private nature and thus outside the prohibitory scope of the
Fourteenth Amendment. But if Section 26 had the effect of authorizing
or encouraging (rather than neutrally "permitting") such private dis-
Although the Fourteenth Amendment itself . . . "speaks to the State . . ." legislation protecting
rights created by that Amendment, such as the right to equal utilization of state facilities, need not
be confined to punishing conspiracies in which state officers participate. 383 U.S. at -, (1966).
See also the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Clark joined by Mr. Justice Black and Mr.
Justice Fortas. Compare: United States v. Price, 383 U.S. - (1966).
14 Id. at 17.
15 Ibid.
16 Peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
1' Shiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964); Watson v. City of Memphis, 373 U.S. 526
(1963) ; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
18 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
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crimination, then its adoption significantly and responsibly involved the
State of California as a participant in the discriminatory activity.
What approach, then, must courts adopt in assessing possible state
responsibility for private acts of discrimination? Certainly, they may not
expressly reject the "state action" requirement and thereby condemn all
private prejudice. But of course, by expansively interpreting the scope
of state responsibility, and finding state involvement in every private act,
the same result could be achieved. Should the courts be able to indirectly
avoid constitutional limitations in the interest of arriving at results which
they deem desirable?
Initially it should be recognized that ad hoc, result-oriented decision-
making must be condemned. Courts are dutybound to develop and articu-
late objective standards for assessing state responsibility, standards
which are applied uniformly, and independently of personal desires con-
cerning the outcome of the particular case.
Professor Wechsler has contended:
The main constituent of the judicial process is precisely that it must be
genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that is involved
in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite transcending the
immediate result that is achieved. 19 [Emphasis added]
Professor Wechsler's thesis has been the source of heated controversy
regarding the proper role of the United States Supreme Court in formu-
lating Constitutional policy (especially in the area of civil rights).2
Surely we no longer expect high appellate tribunals to engage in the
mere mechanical function of rigidly following precedents. Legal disputes
are not decided in a socio-economic vacuum. Judges acquire prejudices
and have policy preferences; it is only natural that such preferences be-
come incorporated into some of their decisions."
A certain amount of this flexibility in judicial review is desirable,
lest our system grow stagnant. However, in the cases herein considered,
some caution may be warranted; for in assessing state responsibility, we
are confronted with a problem of the interpretation of federal jurisdiction
and authority. Theoretically, no federal issue arises under the Fourteenth
19 Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 15
(1959).
20 See for example Miller and Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in Constitutional Adjudi-
cation, 27 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 661 (1960) ; Clark and Trubeck, The Creative Role of the Judge,
71 Yale L. J. 255 (1961); Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity, 108 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1 (1959); Henkin, Some Reflections on Current Constitutional Controversy, 109 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 637 (1961); Bickel, Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. Rev. 40 (1961).
21 See Rostow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATIVE, 7-41 (1962). Also see Donnici, Protector of
Minorities: Mr. Justice Black, 32 U. Mo. at Kans. City L. Rev. 266, 269 (1964).
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Amendment in instances of private racial discrimination unless the state,
in any of its manifestations, becomes significantly involved. Such an
express constitutional limitation could be important not only in promoting
intergovernmental harmony, but in preserving individual freedom from
excessive federal supervision and control. We are then faced with a
potential conflict between significant constitutional liberties: racial equal-
ity versus freedom of individual activity. The Constitution, as the source
of our entire federal system, must survive individual contemporary prefer-
ences, its provisions must be construed with a view toward long-range
community goals and expectations. Result-oriented decisions which are
desirable in light of current social, political and economic trends could
be the basis for undesirable rulings in the future. Personal ad hoc judicial
decision making cannot be justified "except (by) those whose legal litmus
paper is sensitive to the identity of the litigant rather than the merits of
his cause."22 If the Constitution is to be revised, change should come via
the duly established amendatory process, not by judicial fiat.
The late Justice Frankfurter has recognized and eloquently articulated
the limitations imposed upon the judicial office:
We may not draw on our merely personal and private notions and dis-
regard the limits that bind judges in their judicial function. . . .To
practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity no
doubt demands of judges the habit of self-discipline and self-criticism,
incertitude that one's own views are incontestable and alert tolerance
toward views not shared. But these are precisely the presuppositions of
our judicial process. They are precisely the qualities society has a right
to expect from those entrusted with ultimate judicial power.23
22 Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 4, 33 (1959).
Principled judicial decision-making does not necessarily inhibit judges from formulating
standards of interpretation based on personal convictions, so long as these are reasonable in
light of the wording, purpose and historical context of the provision involved. However, once
these criteria are adopted, they should be followed uniformly and without regard to the
identity of the parties or the desirability of the immediate result.
Clearly, a judge may have a genuine and sincere commitment to the principle of freedom
of expression, and such would be necessarily reflected in his interpretation of the First Amend-
ment. But if this commitment is "genuinely principled," the freedom will be recognized and
liberally interpreted within the context of previously defined legal boundaries and accorded to
all groups (subject to these limitations), not merely to groups with which that judge happens
to agree. Compare the majority and dissenting opinions in Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250 (1952). If recent "state action" decisions are open to criticism, then, it is because they
have failed to set forth objectively discoverable standards for measuring state responsibility
for private arbitrary conduct. This leaves the door open for unpredictable result oriented
decision-making in specific findings of state participation in private discrimination against
Negroes. Recent cases come dangerously close to resting on a socially desirable immediate
result (based upon the identity of the class of parties involved) rather than upon long range
objective and uniform considerations of state responsibility.
23 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). Dean Griswold of the Harvard Law
October 1966]
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When the California Supreme Court approached the cases herein
considered to determine whether Section 26 responsibly involved the
State in acts of racial discrimination, it was dutybound to recall the
observation of Justice Black that "it is a Constitution and it is our duty
to bow with respectful submission to its provisions."24 The California
Court was required to search for objective guidelines and standards
previously developed by the United States Supreme Court for assessing
state responsibility under the Fourteenth Amendment. However, as we
shall see, the test established by our highest federal tribunal has been
an extremely vague and nebulous one.25 The test fails to adequately pro-
vide the precise and objectively discoverable standards necessary to guide
subsequent decisions; this compounds the difficulties of the interpretive
function and thereby impedes the task of ascertaining predictable bases
for state responsibility.
Thus, it appears that the United States Supreme Court has done very
little to limit or discourage ad hoc, episodic decision making in this field.
It is reasonable to believe then, that in light of the previously demon-
strated tendency of the Court to expansively construe the boundaries of
federal jurisdictional authority, perhaps the "state action" requirement
will meet a fate similar to the "substantial affect on interstate commerce"
limitation.2 Theoretically, federal authority will become operative only
to the extent that "state action" is present; but, in fact, state involve-
ment will be found present in nearly every area of private activity. As
this broad and plenary interpretation of federal power has been of great
social and economic value in the regulation of interstate activity-so
might it also provide an excellent federal solution to construing "state
School has attempted to reconcile the "human element" vis a vis the responsibilities in judicial
decision-making thusly:
If decisions are reached on the basis of "absolute convictions" rather than through the painful intel-
lectual effort of judgment in the light of the law, then the judicial process is not in its finest flower.
... Though it is clear that judges do "make law," and have to do so, it remains the fact that this is,
at its best an understanding process, not a means of vindicating "absolute convictions." It is a processrequiring great intellectual power, an open and inquiring and resourceful mind, and often courage,
especially intellectual courage, and the power to rise above oneself. Even more than intellectualacumen, it requires intellectual detachment and disinterestedness . . . . When decisions are too . . .
result-oriented, the law and the public are not well served. Griswold, Foreword: Of Time and Attitudes
-Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 93-94 (1960).
24 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 342 (1964) (dissenting opinion).
25 Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961):
Because the virtue of the right to equal protection of the laws could lie only in the breadth of its
application, its constitutional assurance was reserved in terms whose imprecision was necessary . . .
[t~o fashion and apply a precise formula for recognition of state responsibility . . . is an "impossibletask" which "this court has never attempted" . . . only by sifting facts and weighing circumstancescan the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its true significance.
26 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); Heart of Alanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964) ; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
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action" in dealing with problems of private racial discrimination.27
To summarize, then, the judiciary is dutybound to follow and apply
explicit constitutional commands and limitations, such as the Fourteenth
Amendment's "state action" requirement. This further necessitates the
development of objective standards to define the meaning of the provision
and to guarantee its uniform application in future decisions. The exist-
ence of these guiding standards becomes essential in curbing judicial
discretion and discouraging episodic result-oriented decision making.
However, it must be recognized that the United States Supreme Court in
articulating criteria for application of important constitutional principles,
necessarily views problems in light of personal attitudes and relevant
political, social and economic considerations. This being the case, it is
possible that the Court (or rather a majority of its members) will be-
come convinced that private acts of racial discrimination significantly
impede the objectives of the equal protection clause, and that the indi-
vidual's alleged general freedom to discriminate is of only subsidiary
importance. If so, then we should expect the Court's objective criteria
for measuring state action to be formulated in such a way as to reach
nearly all acts of private as well as public discrimination. That is to say
that the uniform standard to be applied would be one which recognized
state responsibility for every and any act of racial discrimination. Such a
judicial view of "state action" would not necessarily be unprincipled,
under Professor Wechsler's definition, so long as it was applied uniformly
as a basis for recognizing state responsibility for all arbitrary private
conduct (racial discrimination, denial of free speech and association, de-
nial of free exercise of religion, taking of property, etc.) independent of
the identity or socially desirable motivations of the parties involved.
To be sure, I do not herein advocate so broad a judicial approach to
the problem of assessing state responsibility for the arbitrary acts of
private individuals. I am not firmly convinced that such a view could
be applied consistently with guarantees of individual liberty. Comprehen-
27 The present congressional trend, however, is to ignore the Fourteenth Amendment as
a source of affirmative legislative power and deal with the evils of private racial discrimina-
tion under its "Commerce" power. See cases, supra, note 26. Indeed, in time this search for
"state action" and the general problem of testing residential racial discrimination under the
Fourteenth Amendment may become moot and superseded by federal legislation banning
certain acts of private discrimination which affect interstate commerce. Professor Wechsler
has advocated that the more difficult problems of private discrimination be solved in federal
and state legislatures "where there is room for drawing lines that courts are not equipped
to draw." Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles o1 Constitutional Law, 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 31
(1959). Compare Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1,
16 (1959).
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sive regulation of individual conduct truly requires the flexible tools of
the legislature rather than the rigidity of judicial constitutional interpre-
tation. And although recent Supreme Court decisions manifest a broader
and more expansive view of state responsibility, they have not had the
effect of converting all private action into state action. The United
States Supreme Court continues to limit the prohibitions of the Four-
teenth Amendment to only those cases where the state has become sig-
nificantly and responsibly involved in the private act of racial discrimina-
tion. In applying this standard, several theories of state responsibility
have been developed. In the remainder of this study, I will attempt to
categorize some of the important relevant judicial decisions according
to the various state action theories which they represent. In each instance
an attempt will be made to relate the particular theory of state responsi-
bility to the problem of residential racial discrimination (with emphasis
on the propriety of the California Supreme Court's use or rejection of
such concepts in invalidating Article I, Section 26).
A. "Community Custom" Theory
As mentioned above, the Civil Rights Cases28 which authoritatively
limited the operation of the Fourteenth Amendment to "state action"
situations, further recognized that the provision would forbid wrongful
acts committed by private individuals and supported by state authority in
the shape of laws, customs or judicial or executive proceedings.29
Thus the Supreme Court recognized the powerful and potentially
deleterious impact of community custom upon the personal rights of
oppressed individuals. Since that time, however, this "custom" principle
has been rarely used by the Court. As a result, there is considerable doubt
as to the legal-Constitutional importance of such harmful customs.
It is relatively easy to prove the existence of a widespread com-
munity custom of residential racial segregation. The custom exists not
only on a national scale, according to recent governmental reports,"° but
also in the various communities within the State of California.3 1 In a
28 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
2 Id. at 17.
30
In 1959, the Commission found that "housing . . . seems to be the one commodity in the Americanmarket that is not freely available on equal terms to everyone who can afford to pay." Today, two
years later, the situation is not noticeably better.
31 U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HOUSING REPORT (1961); REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS: TO SECURE THESE RIGHTS (1947); F.H.A., Structure and Growth of
Residential Neighborhoods in American Cities (1939). See also, McEntire, RESIDENCE AND RACE
(1960).
31STATE OF CALIFORNIA WELFARE STUDY COMM. REPORT: THE PATTERN OF DEPENDENT
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State Welfare Study Commission report, the concept of the "trap
ghetto" was recognized as a real and operating force in California. In
this exhaustive study, the Commission found that Negro citizens, as a
group, tend to be trapped and concentrated in ghettos, thereby isolated
from the rest of the community.2
The California Supreme Court has also recognized the impact, the
operation and the nature of this custom of residential racial segregation.
In Burks v. Poppy Construction Company,3 the Court stated:
Discrimination in housing leads to a lack of adequate housing for
minority groups, and inadequate housing conditions contribute to
disease, crime and immorality.
And in Jackson v. Pasadena City School District:
So long as large numbers of Negroes live in segregated areas, school
authorities will be confronted with difficult problems in providing Negrochildren with the kind of education they are entitled to have. Resi-
dential segregation is in itself an evil which tends to cause antisocial
attitudes and behavior.34
If it is possible to apply this "custom" rationale to private residential
racial discrimination,35 then Justice Frankfurter's statement in Terry v.
Adams would be most relevant to the present inquiry: "Long accepted
customs and habits may generate 'law' as surely as legislative declara-
tion. '36 And Justice Douglas, concurring in Garner v. Louisiana, stated
that where
". segregation is basic to the structure of the community, the custom
that maintains it is as powerful as any law. If [private individuals] also
choose segregation, their preference does not make the action 'private'rather than state action. If it did, a miniscule of private prejudice would
convert state into private action. '37 [Emphasis added]
The proponents of California's Article I, Section 26 argued, how-
ever, that this state has neither officially initiated nor promulgated a policy
or custom of racial segregation in housing.38 Moreover, it must be recog-
POVERTY IN CALIFORmNA (January, 1964). See also, Kaplan, Discrimination in California Hous-
ing, 50 Calif. L. Rev. 635 (1962).
3 2 Supra note 31, at 371-375. See also the affidavit of Earl D. Raab, expert witness (Chief
Consultant to the Social and Economic Committee of the California Social Welfare Board)
in Thomas v. Gouilas, S.F. Municipal Court Trial No. 477388 (1964).
33 57 Cal.2d 463, 471 (1962).
34 59 Cal.2d 876, 881 (1963).
35 And this is doubtful in light of the "custom" factor's prior exclusive use in the context
of a discriminatory practice cultivated and promoted by former laws and official regulations.
See, for example, Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) and Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S.
267 (1963).
36 Supra note 35, at 475.
37 368 U.S. 157, 181 (1961) (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas). Compare Karst
and Van Alstyne, Sit-ins and State Action, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 762 (1962).
38 See note 35, supra.
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nized that Article I, Section 26 did not compel (nor even explicitly en-
courage) racial discrimination. It is true that private property owners
may have practiced discrimination in reliance on the new provision, and
as such, Section 26 could have become a device useful for facilitating
private policies of racial discrimination; but the proponents of the pro-
vision regarded it as a merely neutral state stand, and therefore legally
irrelevant to the existent community custom of residential discrimination.
In Mulkey v. Rietman,"9 the California Supreme Court rejected the
notion of community custom as sufficient, per se to constitute "state ac-
tion." The Court felt that the Fourteenth Amendment could not "impose
upon the state an obligation to take positive action where it is not other-
wise committed to act."4 In short, the Fourteenth Amendment does not
compel the states to take affirmative action to relieve and abate a private
community custom of racial discrimination.
However, it must be noted that California did not merely refrain
from acting thereby leaving private individuals free to pursue their
discriminatory policies in a context of state silence on the subject. By the
adoption of Section 26, California affirmatively approved a provision
which acted upon and reinforced the community custom of residential
segregation. If, in light of the existence of such a custom, Section 26 was
intended to operate so as to necessarily encourage private discriminatory
activity, then the provision was a clear example of state action violative
of the Fourteenth Amendment. With this in mind, let us examine cases
dealing with the importance of motivating legislative intent and purpose.
B. Laws Which Apply to Accomplish or Encourage Racial Discrimination
To examine the issue of Section 26's "neutrality," it is essential to
focus upon yet another judicially developed theory of state action under
the Fourteenth Amendment. Frequently a state law will appear innocuous
on its face. The mere reading of the enactment may reveal no discrimi-
natory purpose or resultant effect whatsoever. Yet when the Court ex-
amines the legislative history, the motivating intent, or the ultimate
operation of the provision, a harsh and flagrantly unconstitutional dis-
criminatory condition may be uncovered.
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins4 the United States Supreme Court was con-
39 64 Adv.Cal. 557, 50 Cal.Rptr. 881 (1966).
40 Id. at 562, 50 Cal. Rptr. at 886. In Mulkey, the majority opinion and both dissenting
opinions overlooked the importance of the existing community custom of residential racial
discrimination. Only upon recognizing the extent and nature of this custom can one appreci-
ate the true purpose and necessary effect of Section 26 in reinforcing and encouraging this
practice of de facto housing segregation.
41 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
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fronted with a San Francisco Municipal Ordinance which sought to
regulate the local laundry industry. Nothing on the face of the provision
would have indicated its harsh anti-Oriental purpose. But, as the Court
stated:
In the present cases we are not obliged to pass upon the validity of the
ordinances complained of; for the cases present the ordinances in actual
operation and the facts shown establish an administration directed
exclusively against a particular class of persons.... The discrimination
is therefore illegal and the public administration which enforces it is a
denial of the equal protection of the laws and a violation of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the Constitution. 42
Similarly, in Lane v. Wilson," a voting regulation which was devoid
of any mention of race and appeared on its face to be non-discriminatory
was, nevertheless, ruled unconstitutional because its necessary effect was
to place onerous burdens on the Negro citizens desiring to exercise their
voting franchise. The Court there indicated that the Constitution "nulli-
fies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of discrimination.""
More recently, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,45 the Court considered an
Alabama statute which, on its face, merely changed the boundaries of the
city of Tuskegee. Upon closer examination it was determined that the new
lines resulted in "removing" nearly 99% of the Negro population from
that city; not a single white resident was affected.
In each of the cases discussed above, the United States Supreme Court
has not hesitated to look behind so-called "innocuous" or "neutrally word-
ed" statutes in order to glean the true intent and necessary operation of
the provisions. Upon finding a discriminatory effect, the Court has held the
law repugnant to the Constitution.
The issue for California, then, was: Did Section 26 necessarily operate
as a device for preserving or promoting residential segregation of the
races? It must be recognized that the California situation differs from that
presented in Yick Wo, Lane and Gomillion. In those cases the controversy
involved only the state authority and the victims of the discrimination. In
each, the state pronounced a policy and then discriminatorily pursued that
policy itself. In California, on the other hand, the State had announced a
policy (i.e., freedom of property owners to sell or rent to whom they
choose), but in no way compelled or participated in the discriminatory
pursuit of the policy.46 In this respect, proponents of Section 26 compared
4 2 1d. at 373, 374.
43 307 U.S. 268 (1939).
44 Id. at 275.
4- 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
46 Of course the state could be involved with the judicial enforcement of the private
property-owner's discriminatory practice, but this aspect of state action will be discussed later.
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the provision to trespass laws; these, of course, give a property owner the
right to decide who may enter upon his premises. It is possible for an owner
of property to exercise racial discrimination under the authority of the law
of trespass. But, argued the proponents, such discrimination is private and
thus outside the ban of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, they would
distinguish trespass provisions and Section 26 from laws in which the
state itself pursues the discriminatory conduct (such as those in the
Yick Wo, Lane and Gomillion cases).
In Mulkey, the California Supreme Court did not adequately con-
sider the "trespass" analogy. However, general trespass laws could
have been distinguished from Section 26 by looking to the history sur-
rounding the enactment of the latter and the discriminatory purpose
which motivated its adoption.4" The opponents of Section 26 asserted that
the provision was enacted to reinforce, implement and promote the ex-
istent community custom 8 of residential racial segregation. As such, they
argued that the state policy was intended to preserve such segregation,
and necessarily resulted in further discrimination by its support and
enforcement of the wrongful custom. In this respect, earlier cases con-
cerning official acts which were applied to effectuate private racial dis-
crimination become extremely important in determining whether Section
26 merely "permits" or affirmatively "encourages" the wrongful private
conduct.49 This distinction is not a mere matter of semantics. United
States Supreme Court decisions recognize the crucial difference between
true state silence (wherein private discrimination is "permitted") and
47 See the ballot argument favoring adoption of Proposition 14, set out infra note 53.
In Mulkey, the California Supreme Court merely noted that Proposition 14 was enacted
against an historical background of anti-discriminatory legislation. 64 Adv.Cal. at 562, 563.
Does this mean that once a state enacts anti-discriminatory legislation, the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibits its repeal or supersession?
48 See text accompanying notes 28 through 40, supra.
49 Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964) ; Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964);
Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963). These cases, when read together, indicate that
even though a state enactment does not compel segregation, the Fourteenth Amendment is
violated when the state or its officials affirmatively announce a policy which encourages cus-
tomary private racial discrimination.
In Robinson, a Florida Board of Health regulation required restaurants to provide
separate rest room facilities for each race. The Supreme Court recognized this as placing a
financial burden on those private restaurants which desired to serve all races. Through this
requirement, Florida was guilty of encouraging private racial discrimination.
See also Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953). Permitting damages in an action against
seller of property who breached a racially restrictive covenant was held violative of the Four-
teenth Amendment. The Court reasoned that if such actions were allowed, private property
owners would be encouraged to discriminate in the transfer of their property.
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affirmative official enactments, racially motivated, which have the pur-
pose of "encouraging" private discrimination.
Prior to examining these cases, however, it is necessary to briefly
recall the important historical highlights of housing segregation in
California. The existence of the community custom of residential segre-
gation has already been noted. In the face of discriminatory patterns of
practice, the California legislature has generally reacted in a most posi-
tive manner.5" The housing field has been no exception.5 Perhaps the
most controversial law in the history of California anti-discrimination
legislation has been the Rumford Act.52 Indeed, it would appear that this
legislation (which was specifically addressed to the prevention of resi-
dential discrimination and enforced by the State Fair Employment Prac-
tice Commission) was the primary target of Article I, Section 26. Of
course the wording of Section 26 conferred broader freedom upon the
property owner than the mere right to discriminate racially in conveying
property interests. The provision would have permitted refusal to sell
or rent on the basis of age, sex, marital and family status, hair color or
any number of other reasons. But there is no state law restraining dis-
criminatory practices on the grounds mentioned; property owners already
have the right to refuse to rent or sell their residences for those reasons.
And even if the California Court would have taken this broader view of
the rights guaranteed, it is doubtful that proponents of the provision
would have been satisfied by a ruling that Section 26, though valid on
its face, was unconstitutional whenever applied to the effectuate racial
discrimination. Indeed the official ballot argument truly evidenced the
racial purposes and considerations which motivated the adoption of
Section 26."
50 Although states are not dutybound, under the Fourteenth Amendment, to prohibit
private racial discrimination, they clearly may enact such regulations (under their general
police power) in an attempt to better provide for the general welfare of their inhabitants.
Accordingly, many states and local communities have prohibited racially discriminatory prac-
tices in housing. Pearl and Turner, Fair Housing Laws: Halfway Mark, 54 Geo. L. J. 156
(1965).
In California, racial discrimination has been prohibited in numerous areas of human
activity. Klein, The California Equal Rights Statutes in Practice, 10 Stan. L. Rev. 253
(1958); Note, Civil Rights: Extent of California Statutes and Remedies Available for
Enforcement, 30 Calif. L. Rev. 563 (1942).
51 The Unruh Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 51, 52 prohibited "businesses" from practicing racial
discrimination in selling or leasing residential property.
52 Cal. Health and S.C. §§ 35700-35744.
53 See the State of California Official Ballot, "Argument in Favor of Proposition 14":
Your "yes" vote on this constitutional amendment will guarantee the right of all home and apartment
owners to choose buyers and renters of their property as they wish, without interference by State or
local government.
Most owners of such property in California lost this right through the Rumford Act of 1963. It says
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Opponents of Section 26 argued that in viewing the provision in its
historical context, its sole purpose and primary effect were to nullify the
anti-discrimination policies of the Rumford Act, and to completely re-
verse the judicially announced general state policy against racial discrimi-
nation.' To those challenging Section 26 perhaps the greatest evil of the
provision was its interdiction of the normal legislative and judicial
processes. This disablement of the legislature and the courts was seen
as a device to protect and perpetuate the current customary discrimina-
tory practices in housing. As such, the State became an ally, an active
party to the "private" discrimination which was practiced under the
protection of the new provision.
In Mulkey, the California Supreme Court found that Article I, Sec-
tion 26 encouraged racial discrimination.
The instant case presents [a] ... situation wherein the state, recogniz-
ing that it could not perform a direct act of discrimination, nevertheless
has taken affirmative action of a legislative nature designed to make
possible private discriminatory practices which previously were legally
restricted. We cannot realistically conclude that, because the final act
of discrimination is undertaken by a private party motivated only by
they may not refuse to sell or rent their property to anyone for reasons of race, color, religion, national
origin, or ancestry.
The Rumford Act established a new principle in our law-that State appointed bureaucrats may
force you, over your objections, to deal concerning your own property with the person they choose.
This amounts to seizure of private property.
Your "yes" vote will require the State to remain neutral: Neither to forbid nor to force a home
or apartment owner to sell or rent to one particular person over another.
Under the Rumford Act, any person refused by a property owner may charge discrimination. The
owner must defend himself, not because he refused, but for his reason for refusing. He must defend
himself for alleged unlawful thoughts.
A politically appointed commission (Fair Employment Practices Commission) becomes investigator,
prosecutor, jury and judge. It may "obtain . . . and utilize the services of all government departments
and agencies" against you. It allows hearsay and opinion evidence.
If you cannot prove yourself innocent, you can be forced to accept your accuser as buyer or tenant
or pay him up to $500 "damages."
You may appeal to a court, but the judge only reviews the FEPC record. If you don't abide by the
decision, you may be jailed for contempt. You are never allowed a jury trial.
If such legislation is proper, what is to prevent the legislature from passing laws prohibiting property
owners from declining to rent or sell for reasons of sex, age, marital status, or lack of financial
responsibility?
Your "yes" vote will prevent such tyranny. It will restore to the home or apartment owner, what-
ever his skin color, religion, origin, or other characteristic, the right to sell or rent his property as he
chooses. It will put this right into the California constitution, where it can be taken away only by
consent of the people at the polls.
The amendment does not affect the enforceability of contracts voluntarily entered into. A voluntary
agreement not to discriminate will be as enforceable as any other. Contrary to what some say, the
amendment does not interfere with the right of the State or Federal government to enforce contracts
made with private parties. This would include Federal Urban Renewal projects, College Housing pro-
grams, and property owned by the State or acquired by condemnation.
Opponents of this amendment show a complete lack of confidence in the fairness of Californians in
dealing with members of minority groups. They believe, therefore, the people must not be allowed to
make their own decisions.
Your "yes" vote will end such interference. It will be a vote for freedom.
54 James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal.2d 721 (1944) ; Hughes v. Superior Court, 22 Cal.2d
850 (1948), affirmed, 339 U.S. 460 (1950) ; Burks v. Poppy Construction Co., 57 Cal.2d 463
(1962) ; Jackson v. Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal.2d 876 (1963) ; Abstract Investment
Co. v. Hutchinson, 204 Cal. App.2d 309 (1962). Compare Cordova v. Housing Authority of
Los Angeles, 130 Cal.App.2d 883 (1955), cert. denied 350 U.S. 696 (1955).
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personal economic or social considerations, we must close our eyes and
ears to the events which purport to make the final act legally possible.
Here the state has affirmatively acted to change its existing laws from
a situation wherein the discrimination practiced was legally restricted
to one wherein it is encouraged, within the meaning of the cited de-
cisions.55 [Emphasis added]
According to Justice Peek, then, Section 26 was violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment because the new enactment (1) changed existing
laws by causing the state to retreat from previous anti-discriminatory
legislation; and (2) thereby encouraged discriminatory private resi-
dential practices. Initially, while the result reached was a desirable one,
the analysis raises difficult conceptual problems. The Court appears to
be holding that once a state enacts anti-discriminatory legislation, any
repeal thereof constitutes state action which encourages private dis-
crimination.
Such a position seemingly fails to take sufficient account of the fact
that, in the field of anti-discriminatory enactments, we are dealing with
legislative policy preferences. The state is not constitutionally duty-
bound to enact such legislation. If such laws are passed, then they may
also be repealed (or superseded) to return the state to a position of true
neutrality in the realm of private racial discrimination. In dissent,
Justice White stated:
I submit the state cannot fairly be held responsible for [private discrim-
inatory] conduct unless it has a duty under the Fourteenth Amendment
to prohibit such conduct.5 6
In an area concerned solely with the rights and obligations of citizens
towards each other, the people have a right either directly or through
their elected representatives to regulate that kind of conduct or not to
regulate it. The adoption of Section 26 . . . evidences the decision of the
people not to regulate such conduct in the sale or leasing of private
residential property and extends such freedom of action to all persons,
unrestricted by racial or religious barriers.57
Clearly both opinions contain certain basic Constitutional truths. As
Justice White contends, states are not dutybound to take affirmative
action to prohibit private residential racial discrimination; the decision
to legislate or refrain from legislating is a policy judgment properly left
to the people and their representatives. On the other hand, official declara-
tions and enactments which encourage private racial discrimination are
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment.58 And this is true even though
55 Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Adv.Cal. 557, 570, 50 Cal.Rptr. 881, 890 (1966).
56 Id. at 587, 50 Cal.Rptr.'at 900.
57 Id. at 587-588, 50 Cal.Rptr. at 900-901.
58 See Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963). In Mulkey, 64 Adv.Cal. at 568, 50
Cal.Rptr. at 888, Justice Peek cited other cases in support of this proposition, notably Robin-
son v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1963) and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
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such enactments are worded neutrally or innocuously on their face. In
each case, the Courts must pierce the verbal veil of the enactment and
examine its purpose and necessary effect.
Here Justice Peek recognized the relevance and significance of
Anderson v. Martin.9 A Louisiana law required all political candidates
to designate their race on nomination papers and ballots. The United
States Supreme Court recognized that the regulation applied to all candi-
dates of all races and that the law in no way expressly compelled or
advised racial discrimination. Nevertheless viewing the purpose of the
regulation in light of a previously established tradition and community
custom of racial inequality, the Court invalidated the law as officially
encouraging private discrimination by voters in violation of equal protec-
tion of laws. In light of Anderson, how should the California Supreme
Court have approached the issue of whether Section 26 was a neutral
policy preference against anti-discriminatory legislation (such as repeal
of legislation would have been) or, an encouragement of private racial
discrimination?
In Anderson, the state, in compelling a racial label to be placed on
the candidate at a crucial moment in the electoral process, indicated to
its voters that race was an important factor in making a political choice.
Under such circumstances the state was guilty of influencing and en-
couraging the private citizen to cast his vote along racial lines. It is
true that the Louisiana requirement involved in Anderson can be super-
ficially distinguished from Section 26 in that it explicitly required a
racial designation. This clearly underscores the racial purpose of the
provision. However, the mere fact that the word "race" does not ex-
pressly appear in the phraseology of Section 26 does not decisively negate
its racial purpose. It has been seen that the motivating intent behind the
California provision was to establish and reinforce the right of the
property owner to transfer his interest along racial lines. Even though
private individuals may vote for political candidates on the basis of
racial consideration and (in the absence of contrary legislation) alienate
property on the basis of racial considerations-the Fourteenth Amend-
ment prohibits states from affirmatively enacting laws which encourage
such racial choices. California's Section 26 was an unconstitutional ex-
ercise of state authority in that it inevitably encouraged racial residential
discrimination. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Anderson v.
Martin, such a provision must be invalidated under the equal protection
clause because
59 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
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In light of 'private attitudes and pressures' towards Negroes at the
time of its enactment could only result in that 'repressive effect' which
was brought to bear only after the exercise of governmental power."
Unfortunately, in Mulkey v. Reitman, the California Supreme Court
majority merely assumed that the provision encouraged private dis-
crimination, while the dissenters just as summarily concluded that Sec-
tion 26 was neutral." None of the opinions undertook an in-depth
analysis of the provision. It is submitted that had such an inquiry been
conducted, appraisal of Section 26 in light of its purpose and necessary
operational effect would reveal that the enactment pronounced an affirma-
tive official policy which clearly encouraged, promoted and reinforced
the established community custom of de facto residential racial segre-
gation.
C. The "Affirmative Duty" Cases
Proponents of Section 26 had asserted that the provision is completely
60ld. at 403, citing Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960) and N.A.A.C.P. v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
See also Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963). There the city of New Orleans had
been the scene of widespread sit-in demonstrations protesting private segregation in eating
establishments. City officials, fearing public violence, publicly pleaded with the demonstrators
for an end to the sit-in activity. The United States Supreme Court viewed such statements as
lending the coercive force of the state to the private custom of segregation of restaurant
facilities. Hence, even neutrally worded official pronouncements may be held denials of equal
protection, where they combine with a deeply entrenched custom to encourage private dis-
criminatory conduct.
61 Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Adv.Cal. 557, 570; 50 Cal.Rptr. 881, 890 (1966). Compare
dissenting opinion of Justice White, 64 Adv.Cal. at 574-576; 50 Cal. Rptr. at 891-893; and
the dissenting opinion of Justice McComb, 64 Adv.Cal. at 582; 50 Cal.Rptr. at 901.
The United States Supreme Court has also had difficulty in characterizing neutrally
worded enactments under this "permit-encourage" distinction. In Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) Mr. Justice Stewart's concurring opinion seized upon
a statute which allowed private restaurants to refuse service to anyone whose presence was
deemed offensive to the majority of customers. Stewart stated: "The highest court in Dela-
ware has thus construed this legislative enactment as authorizing discriminatory classification
based exclusively on color. Such a law seems to me clearly violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 365 U.S. at 726-727.
However, Justices Frankfurter, Harlan and Whittaker disagreed with Mr. Justice Stew-
art's premise that the statute had been construed as "authorizing" racial discrimination. They
believed it just as reasonable to characterize the statute as codifying the common law rule of
official neutrality regarding private racial discrimination. 365 U.S. at 727 (dissenting opinion
of Mr. Justice Frankfurter) ; 365 U.S. at 729 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan joined
by Mr. Justice Whittaker). See also Turner v. City of Memphis, 369' U.S. 350 (1962) cited
by the California Supreme Court in Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Adv.Cal. 557, 570, 50 Cal.Rptr.
881, 889 (1966).
cf. Opinion No. 59-95, 34 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 1, 2-3:
While state action which only incidentally and passively benefits private persons engaging in racialdiscrimination, i.e., the furnishing of police and fire protection, is not prohibited, the tenor of therecent decisions is to the effect that state action which actively encourages and fosters racial discrimi-nation by private persons is unconstitutional.
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neutral on the matter of residential racial discrimination. They had con-
tended that under the Fourteenth Amendment the state has no affirma-
tive duty to legislate against segregation, hence the Federal Constitution
was not violated by a State provision articulating a policy of official
silence. So viewed, Section 26 merely restored to the property owner a
quantum of freedom which could or could not have been exercised dis-
criminatorily.
For the moment then, let us assume arguendo that Section 26 is merely
a "neutral" provision rather than one which affirmatively reinforces an
existent community custom in such a manner as to encourage private
racial discrimination. In such a case, we must take into account that
line of decisions which has recognized a kind of affirmative duty in the
state to protect against racial segregation privately perpetrated. The
issue here relevant is: Even if Section 26 stated a mere neutral policy
of silence regarding residential discrimination, did California violate the
Fourteenth Amendment by disabling itself from fulfilling an affirmative
duty to prohibit racial discrimination in the field of housing?
Many of these "affirmative duty" cases arise in the context of public
(or quasi-public) functions which the state has authorized private indi-
viduals or organizations to perform. For example, in Smith v. Allwright 2
the United States Supreme Court was confronted with a situation in
which the State of Texas had permitted the Democratic Party of Texas
(a private organization) to conduct its own primary elections. Inasmuch
as Negroes were privately excluded from membership in the Party, they
were unable to participate in the primary.6" The Court held that in view
of the state's delegation of authority to the private organization, the
discriminatory action of the private group was under color of state
authority and thus unconstitutional under the Fifteenth Amendment. 4
Ultimately, in Terry v. Adams, 5 the Court prohibited a practice
whereby the all white "Jaybird Association" held informal (i.e., not
state controlled) "caucuses" and endorsed candidates for the Democratic
62 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
(13 The Court noted that the candidate winning the Democratic Party primary was
almost always assured of attaining office. Hence the Negroes were excluded from the principal
phase of the electoral process. Id. at 659-666.
64 The Fifteenth Amendment is also addressed to "state action" rather than private
action. Dean Pollak has observed that in the light of the evil to be prohibited by the
Fifteenth Amendment (discrimination in voting) and the importance of the voting franchise
perhaps a more lenient standard of state involvement is warranted. Pollak; Racial Discrim-
ination and Judicial Integrity, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 23 (1959).
5) 345 U.S. 461 (1953).
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Party nomination.66 In finding unconstitutional state action, Justice Black
stated: .
For a state to permit such a duplication of its election processes is to
permit a flagrant abuse of those processes to defeat the purposes of the
Fifteenth Amendment. 67
In the Jaybird case, Justice Frankfurter took the opportunity to elaborate
upon the "state action" concept. His concurring opinion is most explicit:
This phrase [state action] gives rise to a false direction in that it implies
some impressive machinery or deliberate conduct normally associated
with what orators call a sovereign state. The vital requirement is State
responsibility-that somewhere, somehow, to some extent there be an
infusion of conduct by officials, panoplied with State power, into any
scheme by which colored citizens are denied voting rights merely be-
cause they are colored. 68 [Emphasis added]
Therefore, even though a private discriminatory activity was involved,
the Constitution was violated. This means that under the circumstances,
it was not enough for the state to remain neutral. Instead the state was
dutybound to guard against private discrimination. However, the voting
cases must be read in light of the important quasi-public function which
the private organization controlled; no general affirmative duty for the
state to guard against all kinds of private racial discrimination can be
honestly read into these cases. 9
Also, consider the 1946 decision, Marsh v. Alabama.70 There, the
activities of a privately owned "company town" were held to constitute
"state action" under the Fourteenth Amendment. Again in this case it
was important to the Court that the private facilities were built pri-
marily for the benefit of the public; the operation was essentially a public
function subject to state regulation. Under the recent Griffin71 case
(where the county abdicated its responsibility for maintaining schools,
66Again, Justice Black noted that, with few exceptions, Jaybird candidates had won
without opposition in the Democratic primaries. Id. at 463.
67 Id. at 469.
68 Id. at 473.
69 This is especially emphasized in the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Vinson and
Justices Clark, Reed and Jackson, Id. at 477, 482-484.
See also United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73
(1932) ; Rice v. Elmore, 165 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1947) ; Baskin v. Brown, 174 F.2d 391 (4th
Cir. 1949).
70 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
71 Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Board, 377 US. 218 (1964).
Interestingly enough, the United States Supreme Court has refused to review cases which
seek to compel public school districts to take affirmative steps to relieve de facto racial segre-
gation. Bell v. School, City of Gary, Indiana, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1964), cert. denied,
377 U.S. 924 (1964); Downs v. Board of Education of Kansas City, 336 F.2d 988 (10th
Cir. 1964). Compare Branche v. Board of Education, 204 F.Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
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deferring instead to private schools which engaged in racial discrimi-
nation), it was made clear that the state cannot avoid the responsibility
for discrimination in quasi-public activities merely by delegating the
power to perform these functions to private agencies.
It seems apparent that these "quasi-public function" cases have little
persuasive weight in creating a constitutional duty in the State of Cali-
fornia to affirmatively prohibit racial discrimination in the transfer of
private property.72
Yet, in Mulkey, the California Supreme Court expressly applied the
cases of Smith v. Allwright, Terry v. Adams and Marsh v. Alabama.73
Justice Peek especially relied on the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in Evans v. Newton, as a "similar abdication of a traditional
governmental function" (maintenance of a park) for the purpose of per-
mitting private discrimination.7 4 In his use of these precedents, Justice
Peek stated:
Those cases are concerned not so much with the nature of the functioninvolved as they are with who is responsible for conduct in performance
of that function. 75
This position seems to ignore the clear language of Evans v. Newton
which recognized that the governmental nature of the activity being car-
ried out is of primary concern.76 Indeed, it is the governmental nature
of the function which creates the state responsibility for the private
discriminatory conduct which transpires.
However, another line of affirmative duty cases may be of more in-
terest. If the state undertakes an obligation to regulate a given activity
(even of a non-governmental nature) it is then dutybound to guard
against occurrences of private racial discrimination therein.77 At this
72The so-called "public custody" cases seem equally inapplicable for similar reasons.
These cases merely recognize an affirmative duty to protect the Fourteenth Amendment rights
of individuals in custody. Catlette v. United States, 132 F.2d 902 (5th Cir. 1951) ; Lynch v.
United States, 189 F.2d 476 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied 342 U.S. 831 (1963); Williams v.
United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
73 64 Adv.Cal. at 567, 568; 50 Cal.Rptr. at 887, 888.
74 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
In Evans, heavily relied upon by the California Supreme Court in Mulkey, the United
States Supreme Court held the Fourteenth Amendment to forbid private control and racial
discrimination of a Macon, Georgia park; the tradition of municipal control had become too
firmly established. Compare Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Board, 377 U.S. 218
(1964) and Pennsylvania v. Board of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957) ; In re
Girard College Trusteeship, 391 Pa. 434; 138 A.2d 844, cert. denied, 357 U.S. 570 (1958).
76 64 Adv.Cal. at 568; 50 Cal.Rptr. at 888.
76 382 U.S. 296 at - (1966).7 7 As early as 1944, in Steele v. Louisville N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944), which concerned
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point, the opponents of Section 26 could possibly have argued that the
right to own and transfer property exists only by virtue of the laws of the
state,7 for as Chief Justice Traynor has observed, legal rights are reali-
ties "only when enforceable. ' 79 Under this theory, perhaps the Four-
teenth Amendment would prohibit California from enacting a provision
(such as Section 26) which permits the discriminatory operation of its
laws governing transfer of residential property. As mentioned above,
however, such a position would certainly be stretching the "affirmative
duty" theory beyond all prior limits. In Mulkey, the California court
specifically rejected this approach to assessing state responsibility.
The parties generally concede that in an organized and regulated
society the state or its subdivisions play some part in most, if not all,
so-called private transactions, . . . that many of the rights and duties
arising out of the transfer of an interest in real property are related to
or dependent upon the state or local governments. But it is not the
mere fact that in some manner the state is involved, however remotely,
with which we are concerned. It is only where the state is significantly
involved that the prohibitions of the equal protection clause are in-
voked.80 [Emphasis added]
This statement by the Court makes its reliance on the "affirmative duty"
cases even more perplexing and unacceptable.
racial discrimination by a private labor union, Justice Murphy stated in his concurring
opinion:
The Corstitutional problem inherent in this instance is clear . .. While such a union is essentially a
private organization, its power to represent and bind all members of a class is derived solely fromCongress [which could not] authorize the representative to act so as to ignore the rights guaranteed by
the Constitution. 323 U.S. at 208.
Cf. N.L.R.B. v. Pacific American Association, 218 F.2d 913, 917 (9th Cir. 1955).
Moreover, in the public utility cases where state law permits privately owned transpor-
tation companies to make rules regarding seating of passengers, and pursuant to this authori-
zation the private companies practice racial discrimination-such is tantamount to "state
action" repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. Bowman v. Birmingham Transit Co., 280
F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960); McCabe v. Atcheson, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 US. 151 (1914). And
where the discriminator is operating with financial assistance from a governmental agency,
the Constitution is violated. Simkins v. Moses H. Cone, 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 376 U.S. 938.
According to the California Supreme Court, the unconstitutionality of Article I, Section
26 is even closer as applied to private property which is publicly financed. "The 'state action'
which was evident in Mulkey without this facet of state participation is thus even more
positively identified in the instant case." Peyton v. Barrington Plaza Corp., 64 Adv.Cal. 594,
596; 50 Cal.Rptr. 905, 907 (1966); Redevelopment Agency of City of Fresno v. Buckman,
64 Adv.Cal. 603-; 50 Cal.Rptr. 912 (1966); cf. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y.
512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 981 (1950).
In all of these cases, the state is so responsibly involved in the private activity that the
discrimination is viewed as though it had occurred in the context of a publicly operated
function or a publicly owned facility.
78 Powell, Property Rights and Civil Rights, 15 Hastings L.J. 135 (1963); Lathrop,
Racial Covenant Cases, 1948 Wis. L. Rev. 508, 515 (1948).
79 Traynor, Law and Social Change, 1956 U. Ill. L. Forum 230, 238 (1956).
80 64 Adv.Cal. at 564; 50 Cal.Rptr. at 886.
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D. The "Judicial Enforcement" Theory: Shelley v. Kraemer Revisited.
In 1948, the United States Supreme Court announced its decision in
Shelley v. Kraemer8 holding that the judicial enforcement of a racially
restrictive covenant was state action repugnant to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.82 The Shelley case has been the source of much controversy regard-
ing the state action requirement.8 3 On one extreme, the case is inter-
preted to mean that any judicial enforcement of privately perpetuated
racial discrimination is sufficient to constitute state action within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment:
The law of contracts is not a matter of private agreement. The agree-
ments entered may be classified as private affairs. However, when resort
is had to a state court seeking enforcement for breach of such an agree-
ment, it is the law of contracts which then must be invoked ...
Agreements may reside in the sphere of private acts; their enforcement
by a court invades the domain of sovereign action and must partake of
the Constitutional limitations affixed thereto.8 4
And Professor Henkin has stated:
Private persons may discriminate.... But if the state lends the support
of its institutions to enforce the discrimination, the state is responsible;without the state's aid, the discrimination would not be effective. State
effectuation of private discrimination, state encouragement of private
discrimination, perhaps even state toleration of private discrimination
are possible grounds for holding the state responsible for discrimination
enforced by its courts. If the state is responsible, it is violating the equal
protection clause. 85
Other commentators wisely observe that to interpret Shelley to mean
that any judicial enforcement of private discrimination is unconstitutional"state action," would be the first step in converting all private action into
state action.8" Regardless of how beneficial such an extension would
81 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
82In Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917), the Supreme Court invalidated a city
zoning ordinance which compelled racial segregation in housing. See also Harmon v. Tyler,
273 U.S. 668 (1926); City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704 (1930). In Shelley, the
Court indicated that a racial zoning situation could not be legally accomplished by use of
judicially enforced racial covenants any more than it could by use of racial zoning laws.
See also Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948) and Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
In the latter case, the Shelley rationale was applied to bar an action for damages between
co-covenantors for breach of a racially restrictive covenant.
83 The legal periodical commentary has been plentiful. See, for example, McGovney,
Racial Residential Segregation, 33 Calif. L. Rev. 5 (1945); Lathrop, The Racial Covenant
Cases, 1948 Wis. L. Rev. 508 (1948); Ming, Racial Restrictions and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 16 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 203 (1949); Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity,
108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1959); Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion,
110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473 (1962) and other articles too numerous to set out.
84 Scanlon, Racial Restrictions in Real Estate, 24 Notre Dame Law. 157, 172-3 (1949).
85 Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473, 486
(1962).
86 Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1 (1959);
44 Calif. L. Rev. 718 (1956).
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appear in the light of the current socio-political awareness of the impor-
tance of equal civil rights-that interpretation would change the whole
character of the Fourteenth Amendment. The original and indeed the
continuing purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was and is to circum-
scribe the arbitrary power of state governments. It was not addressed to
private action because under the Federal Constitution, individuals are at
liberty to act arbitrarily in this regard. To apply the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to cover nearly all aspects of private activity is tantamount to a
change in the meaning of the provision. If this is to be done, then tradi-
tional amendatory processes should be followed. But as the law now
stands, Professor Paul Kauper has noted, "The Constitution is concerned
with constitutional liberties in the classic sense of the Western world,
i.e., as liberties of the individual to be safeguarded against the power of
the state. '87
What construction, then, should be given our "rule in Shelley's case"?
To answer this question, perhaps the words of Chief Justice Vinson's
opinion for the Court are most appropriate. The Chief Justice first noted
the importance of the individual property right involved:
It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be pro-tected from discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth Amendment
are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own, and dispose of property. ... 'Allcitizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State
... , as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease,sell, hold and convey real and personal property'.88
Chief Justice Vinson then turned to the problem of "state action," noting
that a racial zoning regulation "could not be squared with the require-
ments of the Fourteenth Amendment if imposed by state statute or local
ordinance. ' S9
87 Kauper, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THlE CONSTITUTION 129 (1962). This argument, however,
has far less significance in a case such as is presented by Section 26, where the State Consti-
tution seems to interdict and paralyze the state legislative processes which would otherwise be
available for defining private relationships regarding residential racial discrimination. Of
course, Section 26 itself could be regarded as a kind of "legislative" or "political" choice on
the issue.
8sShelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1948), citing U.S.C. §1982; see also Cal.
Const. Art. I, §1: "All men . . . have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of
enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing, and protecting property; and
pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness." Can Article I, Section 26 be read as amending
Article I, Section 1 to mean that all citizens have a right to acquire and possess property except
as modified by the discretionary racial choices of the property owner? If so, perhaps this
could be another argument against the validity of Section 26. Compare Kauper, CIVIL LIBERTIES
AND THE CONSTITUTION 142-146 (1962). But, of course, this again relates to the central and
crucial issue of whether or not Section 26 is a "neutral" provision.
89 Shelley v. Kraemer, supra at 11, citing Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
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But the present cases. . . do not involve action by state legislatures or
city councils. Here the particular patterns of discrimination and the
areas in which the restrictions are to operate are determined ...by
the terms of agreements among private individuals. Participation of the
state consists in the enforcement of the restrictions so defined ....
[T] he action inhibited by the... Fourteenth Amendment is only such
action as may fairly be said to be that of the States. That Amendment
erects no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory
or wrongful.90
It is at this point that the Court adopted a restricted approach to
the judicial state action concept. After concluding that the racial cove-
nants themselves and any voluntary adherence thereto would not be
regarded as violative of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court elabo-
rated on the specific act of judicial enforcement that had occurred:
... [T]he petitioners were willing purchasers of properties upon which
they desired to establish homes. The owners of the properties were will-
ing sellers; and contracts of sale were accordingly consummated. It is
clear that but for the active intervention of the state courts, supported
by the full panoply of state power, petitioners would have been free to
occupy the properties in question without restraint.
These are not cases .. .in which the states have merely abstained
from action, leaving private individuals free to impose such discrimina-
tion as they see fit. Rather these are cases in which the states have
made available to such individuals the full coercive power of govern-
ment to deny to petitioners, on the grounds of race or color, the en-
joyment of property rights in premises which petitioners are willing
and financially able to acquire and which the grantors are willing to
sell.91 [Emphasis added]
Thus, California's Section 26 can be read as being outside of the
Shelley rule in that it does not compel discrimination on the part of
"willing" buyers and "willing" sellers of property.9 2 Indeed, proponents
of Section 26 argued that the provision does no more than (in Chief
Justice Vinson's words) leave "private individuals free to impose such
discriminations as they see fit."
In Mulkey, however, Justice Peek (in his opinion for the majority
of the Court) drew liberally from the language of Shelley, and ap-
parently ignored the limitations which Chief Justice Vinson attached to
that ruling. The California Court relied upon Shelley v. Kraemer as
conclusive authority for the proposition that "when one who seeks to
discriminate solicits and obtains the aid of the court in the accomplish-
ment of that discrimination, significant state action, within the proscrip-
tion of the equal protection clause, is involved."93
90 Shelley v. Kraemer, supra at 12-13.
91 Id. at 19.
92 Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 12-18
(1959).
93 Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Adv.Cal. 557 at 566; 50 CaI.Rptr. 881 at 887 (1966).
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In so holding, the California Supreme Court approved of an earlier
lower court decision in Abstract Investment Co. v. Hutchinson:'
In applying the Shelley reasoning that the process of the court cannot
be utilized to accomplish a private discrimination, it has been held
reversible error to exclude evidence that the plaintiff landlord in an
eviction proceeding was motivated purely by racial considerations, al-
though the tenant was admittedly in default (citing the Abstract In-
vestment Co. case).
The instant case [Mulkey] may be distinguished from the Shelley
and Abstract cases only in that those who would discriminate here are
not seeking the aid of the court to that end. Instead they are in court
only because they have been summoned there by those against whom
they seek to discriminate.95
The crucial distinctions in Mulkey which failed to impress the California
Court were, in fact, the decisive differences for the United States Supreme
Court in its ruling in Shelley v. Kraemer. In adopting so unrestricted a
view of Shelley, the California Supreme Court seems to have effectively
abolished the "state action" requirement and turned its back on the
reasonable interpretation of Shelley. But even this is uncertain. For sub-
sequently, in Hill v. Miller," the California Court refused to apply the
Shelley and Abstract Investment rulings to a case in which a Negro
tenant was evicted on the basis of racial considerations.
Clearly Justice White's dissent in Mulkey is more direct and far less
confusing regarding the role of judicial enforcement under the Fourteenth
Amendment:
Neither case [Shelley nor Barrows v. Jackson97] supports the proposi-
94 204 Cal.App.2d 242; 22 Cal.Rptr. 309 (1962). The opinion in this case was written by
then District Court of Appeal Justice Louis Burke (now Associate Justice of the California
Supreme Court). But compare Hill v. Miller, 64 Adv.Cal. 819, 821, 822; 51 Cal.Rptr. 689, 690
(1966).
95 64 Adv.Cal. at 566; 50 Cal.Rptr. at 887.
96 64 Adv.Cal. 819; 51 Cal.Rptr. 689 (1966). The court permitted the eviction of a
Negro tenant even though the landlord's act was based solely on racial considerations. The
landlord, of course, could not rely on the invalidated Article I, Section 26, but nevertheless
could privately discriminate. "The Fourteenth Amendment does not impose upon the state
the duty to take positive action to prohibit a private discrimination." 64 Adv.Cal. at 821, 51
Cal.Rptr. at 690. The Court noted that neither the Rumford nor the Unruh anti-discrimi-
nation statutes were applicable to the present case and expressly, but unsatisfactorily, dis-
tinguished the Abstract Investment case. 64 Adv.Cal. at 821-822, 51 Cal.Rptr. at 690. Com-
pare text accompanying notes 94 and 95, supra. In dissenting from Mulkey, Mr. Justice
White clearly noted the importance, of the fact that Shelley involved a willing Caucasian
seller and a willing Negro buyer. Under those circumstances the transfer could not be
enjoined by a judicially enforced racially restrictive covenant [citing Mr. Justice Black's
opinion in Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 330-331 (1964)]. 64 Adv. Cal. at 579-580, 50 Cal.
Rptr. at 895-896.
9T 346 U.S. 249 (1953). In my opinion, Barrows would have been even better persuasive
authority than Shelley. There, the United States Supreme Court held that a judicial award
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tion that a state court would have been under a constitutional mandate
to compel an owner to sell to a Negro if he preferred to adhere volun-
tarily to his restrictive agreement.98
The mere act of petitioning for judicial relief should not be sufficient to
convert private discrimination into "state action." For as Dean Pollak
has observed, states should be able to enforce private prejudice without
becoming significantly responsible for, or a joint participant in the dis-
crimination. It is only when the courts (or any governmental institution)
compel or affirmatively encourage private parties to discriminate against
their present will (by enforcing prior agreements) that state responsibility
is present within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment."
Admitting the inapplicability of Shelley, however, would not preclude
a finding of Section 26's unconstitutionality. Even though Shelley does
not prevent the judicial enforcement of "purely private discrimination,"
the Fourteenth Amendment does prohibit the affirmative enactment
and enforcement of provisions which encourage such private discrimina-
tion. In adopting Section 26 against a customary background of housing
segregation, California has affirmatively announced its approval of resi-
dential discrimination, and its willingness to enforce and thereby "en-
courage" (within the meaning of Barrows).
ASSESSING STATE RESPONSIBILITY: THE RECENT CASES
As stated earlier the United States Supreme Court has refused to
articulate a specific and well-defined test for determining the quality of
state participation in private discrimination necessary to invoke the
strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead the Court proceeds
espisodically, evaluating each case on its own fact. Thus, in Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority... Justice Clark re-affirmed that "private
conduct abridging individual rights does no violence to the equal protec-
tion clause unless to some significant extent the State in any of its mani-
of damages against a former property owner (who had sold to a Negro in violation of a
racially restrictive covenant) constituted discriminatory state action. The Court recognized
that the damage award neither prevented nor discouraged the specific transfer of property to
the particular Negro buyer involved (who was already in possession of that property). How-
ever, "the result of that sanction by the State would be to encourage the use of restrictive
covenants" and to indirectly "coerce" future sellers to abide by such discriminatory agree-
ments whether they wanted to or not. 346 U.S. at 254.
98 64 Adv.Cal. at 584; 50 Cal.Rptr. at 898.
99 Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity, 108 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1, 12-18 (1959).
Compare Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 348 U.S. 292 (1954); vacated 349
U.S. 70 (1955); Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956); Pennsylvania v. Board
of Directors of City Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
100 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
[Vol. 1
1RESIDENTIAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
festations has been found to have become involved in it."''1 But in
evaluating "state involvement," Justice Clark observed:
Because the virtue of the right to equal protection of the laws could be
only in the breadth of its application, its Constitutional assurance was
reserved in terms whose imprecision was necessary if the right were tobe enjoyed in the variety of individual-state relationships which the
Amendment was designed to embrace. For the same reason, to fashion
and apply a precise formula for recognition of state responsibility under
the Equal Protection Clause is an 'impossible task' which 'This Court
has never attempted' . . . Only by sifting facts and weighing circum-
stances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct
be attributed its true significance.102 [Emphasis added]
The Burton case concerned racial discrimination by a private res-
taurant which was located within an off-street building owned and oper-
ated by the Wilmington Parking Authority (an agency of the State of
Delaware). The privately owned restaurant claimed to be acting in a
purely private capacity under its lease. The Supreme Court disagreed.
In finding state involvement in the private discrimination, the Court
seized upon many factual circumstances present: the land and building
were publicly owned; the building was dedicated to "public uses" in
the Authority's performance of "essential government functions"; the
privately leased areas constituted an integral and indispensable part
of the State's plan to operate its parking project as a self-sustaining unit;
the State was responsible for maintenance of the entire building; the
parking facility and the restaurant enjoyed a variety of mutual benefits
(e.g., customers of one often used the facilities of the other); profits
earned by the restaurant's discriminatory business operation contributed
to the financial success of the governmental agency.10 3
The sum total of all of these elements convinced the Court that "the
degree of state participation and involvement in the discriminatory action"
was the type -which the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to con-
demn.'
The State has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence
with [the private restaurant] that it must be recognized as a joint par-
ticipant in the challenged activity, which, on that account, cannot be
considered to have been so 'purely private' as to fall without the scope
of the Fourteenth Amendment.10 5
The vague "responsibility" test promulgated in Burton makes it very
difficult to objectively appraise the validity of Section 26. Nevertheless,
101 Id. at 722.
102 id. at 722.
103 Id. at 723-725.
104 Id. at 724.
105 Id. at 725. The Court here reiterates its requirement for a case by case consideration
of state responsibility; not every private tenant of the state will be affected. Id. at 725-726.
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the California Supreme Court treated the problem as a relatively easy
one to solve. Seizing upon the broad language of Burton, Justice Peek
asserted that Section 26 significantly involved California in acts of private
racial discrimination because it had the effect of encouraging such dis-
crimination. 10 6 In fact the Burton case, as decided by the United States
Supreme Court majority, is in no way relevant or factually analogous to
Mulkey. The Burton Court's bases for finding state participation and
"significant involvement," set out above, are in no way comparable to
problems of state responsibility under Section 26.
Perhaps realizing this, Justice Peek turned for support to. Mr. Justice
Stewart's concurring opinion in Burton which focused upon a state enact-
ment allowing private restaurants "to refuse to serve persons whose re-
ception ... would be offensive to the major part of his customers." Accord-
ing to Justice Stewart, this statute was violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment "as authorizing discriminatory classification based exclu-
sively on color.""'7 Justice Stewart's position is clearly relevant to the
question of the validity of Section 26. However, as Justices Frankfurter, 108
Harlan and Whittaker'0 9 point out, it suffers from the same defect as the
Mulkey decision: it assumes, without proof or sufficient underlying
support, that the innocuously and neutrally worded statute "authorizes"
or "encourages" private discrimination. As stated earlier, the Fourteenth
Amendment clearly prohibits official enactments "encouraging" private
discrimination, but no Supreme Court decision has precluded the states
from articulating neutral positions, which would merely "permit" such
activity. (Otherwise trespass laws would be unconstitutional when in-
voked by an owner of a private residence to exclude others from his
property on the basis of racial or religious considerations.) I reiterate
that the distinction between laws encouraging or authorizing racial preju-
dice as opposed to laws which merely permit such private prejudice can
be meaningfully drawn only after an exhaustive and comprehensive exami-
nation of the purpose and necessary effect of the provision's operation.
Neither Mr. Justice Stewart (in Burton) nor Justice Peek (in Mulkey)
undertook such an inquiry. Only if we view Section 26 as having the
purpose and necessary effect of reinforcing the firmly entrenched com-
munity custom of residential segregation can we justifiably hold the
State of California as an ally and joint participant in the private acts of
racial discrimination which occurred.
106 Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Adv.Cal. 557, 564-565; 50 Cal.Rptr. 881, 886 (1966).
107 365 U.S. at 726-727, cited in Mulkey, 64 Adv.Cal. at 569; 50 Cal.Rptr. at 889.
108 365 U.S. at 727-728 (dissenting opinion).
109 365 U.S. at 728-730 (dissenting opinion).
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The recent case of Evans v. Newton" was also strongly relied upon
by the majority opinion in Mulkey. In Evans the United States Supreme
Court ruled that where a city had been trustee of a private park under
circumstances whereby the tradition of municipal control had become
firmly established, the proposed substitution of private trustees would
not preclude the application of the Fourteenth Amendment's ban against
racial discrimination. Mr. Justice Douglas, in his opinion for the Court
explicitly emphasized that the finding of state responsibility was "...
buttressed by the nature of the service rendered the community." In
Evans, the private park (for a number of reasons) assumed the char-
acter which was "municipal in nature.""' Hence, the California Supreme
Court's reliance on Evans seems misplaced. The quality and quantity of
state participation in the two cases is significantly different.
Again in the use of Evans as persuasive authority, the California
Supreme Court found supporting language in a concurring opinion; this
time that of Mr. Justice White."' White noted that state laws which
made it possible for a settlor to establish a racially discriminatory trust
neither coerced nor expressly encouraged such discrimination. Never-
theless, Justice White felt that the state could be responsible for uncon-
stitutionally encouraging private racial restrictions. However, Mr. Jus-
tice White did not merely assume that all state laws which allow private
discrimination per se encourage the invidious activity. His position was
more guarded and reasonable. Mr. Justice White felt that Georgia law
generally prohibited restrictions in all charitable dedications to the
public except for restrictions based on race. As such the case was "viewed
as one where the State had forbidden all private discrimination except
racial discrimination.""' Hence, the enactment's racial purpose was un-
covered and the provision could fairly be characterized as encouraging
or authorizing private discrimination.
This problem of distinguishing state "neutrality" from state "en-
couragement" in the private racial discrimination area has been one that
has greatly troubled the United States Supreme Court. I have alluded
to the dispute in Burton, between concurring Justice Stewart's position
and the opposing views of dissenting Justices Harlan, Frankfurter and
110 382 US. 296 (1966).
111 Id. at -
112Discussed in Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Adv.Cal. at 570-571; 50 Cal.Rptr. at 890.
113 382 U.S. at . Although, on its face, Article I, Section 26 of the California Con-
stitution confers broader freedom ,the purpose and true operational effect primarily. guarantees
the right of the property owner to refuse to sell or rent on the basis of racial considerations.
See note 53, supra.
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Whittaker. In Evans Justice White's concurrence was very guarded. The
Court opinions in Anderson v. Martin"4 and Lombard v. Louisiana"5
found state encouragement only after a clear showing that the neutrally
worded requirement (patently based on racial considerations) in the
former and official declarations in the latter had the intended purpose and
effect of reinforcing an existent well-established community custom of
private discrimination.
Perhaps the most problematic area of assessing state neutrality or
responsibility, however, has been that of state enforcement of trespass
laws. In Bell v. Maryland,"6 Negro "sit-in" demonstrators were con-
victed of violating the State criminal trespass law in refusing to leave a
private restaurant which denied service to Negroes. The important con-
stitutional issue presented was whether the State's enforcement of its
trespass law to effectuate the discriminatory practices of the private
restaurant constituted "state involvement" in the discrimination repug-
nant to the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court avoided deciding the
Constitutional issue,"' much to the consternation of six of the members
of the Court who were anxious to reach a decision on the merits. Chief
Justice Warren, Justice Douglas," 8 and Justice Goldberg"' felt that
there was sufficient state action to render the discrimination unconstitu-
tional.
Dissenting Justices Black, Harlan and White rejected the notion of
state responsibility for the discrimination involved.' Mr. Justice Black
refused to accept Shelley v. Kraemer2' as establishing a principle that
all "judicially enforced" discrimination was state action. Justice Black
found that the essence of the Shelley decision was that the State had
compelled discrimination even though the private parties immediately
involved did not wish to discriminate." As Justice Black stated:
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, standing alone, does not pro-
114 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
115373 U.S. 267 (1963).
116 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
117 The Court remanded the case to the Maryland Court of Appeals to determine the
effect of a supervening change in the state law (enactment of a Public Accommodations law).
Id. at 241-242.
118 Id. at 242 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas joined by Mr. Justice Gold-
berg).
119 Id. at 286 (concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Goldberg joined by Chief Justice War-
ren and Mr. Justice Douglas).
120 Id. at 318 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Black, joined by Mr. Justice Harlan
and Mr. Justice White).
121334 U.S. 1 (1948).
12 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. at 328-332.
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hibit privately owned restaurants from choosing their own customers. 23
In Mulkey, it was argued that if private restaurant owners may use
neutral trespass laws (and the state's criminal law enforcement ma-
chinery) to effectuate their private racial discrimination, private property
owners should have a similar power under Article I, Section 26.
But, consider Griffin v. Maryland.124 There, a private amusement
park implementing its policy of racial discrimination, employed a private
policeman who incidentally happened to be a deputy sheriff. In holding
the acts of the employee to be state action, the Court stated:
If an individual is possessed of State authority and purports to act
under that authority, his action is state action. It is irrelevant that he
might have taken the same action had he acted in a purely private
capacity.125
And further:
[T]o the extent that the State undertakes an obligation to enforce a
private policy of racial segregation, the state is charged with racial dis-
crimination and violates the Fourteenth Amendment.' 26
Opponents of Section 26 used the Griffin language to show that even
though the Fourteenth Amendment could not reach "purely private"
housing discrimination, it does prohibit property owners who are "pos-
sessed of state authority" (Section 26) ". . . and purport to act under that
authority," from engaging in racial discrimination. Inasmuch as Section
26 protects and insulates those who so discriminate, opponents of the
provision argued that the State has "undertaken an obligation to enforce
a private policy of racial segregation."
In Griffin, Justices Harlan, Black and White again dissented:
It seems clear ... that the involment of the State is no different from
what it would have been had the arrests been made by a regular police-man dispatched from police headquarters. I believe, therefore, that this
case is controlled by the principles discussed in Mr. Justice Black's
opinion in Bell v. Maryland.127
In his opinion for the Court, however, Chief Justice Warren dis-
tinguished the "regular policeman" case by showing that the employee
here was a deputy sheriff specifically "under contract to protect and en-
force the racial segregation policy" of the private park. 21
123 Id. at 343.
124 378 U.S. 130 (1964).
125 Id. at 135, citing Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) and Williams v. United
States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951) both of which concerned wrongful acts of law enforcement officers.
Perhaps, then, the Griffin decision must be limited to facts involving the activity of an official
agent of the government.
126 Id. at 136, citing Pennsylvania v. Board of Trusts, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
127 Id. at 138 (dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan, joined by Mr. Justice Black
and Mr. Justice White).
128 Id. at 137.
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The issue for the California Court in assessing the validity of Section
26, then, could have been framed as follows: Was the provision like
general trespass laws, a neutral statement of policy concerning property
rights (here, free alienation of property interests)? Or, was it a specific
grant of state authority with the purpose and necessary operational effect
of promoting, authorizing and encouraging the prior custom of private
residential racial discrimination? In this context, Mulkey v. Reitman
could have been viewed as truly presenting a case of first impresssion.
In fact, no clear authority existed which would have been precisely or
decisively in point. Instead, however, the California Court elected to
mold the Mulkey case to fit the rationale and language of Burton, Shelley
v. Kraemer and Evans v. Newton. In drawing liberally from the language
of these cases, the Court neglected the significant factual and conceptual
differences which distinguish those cases from Mulkey. In each of the
United States Supreme Court cases cited by the California Court, the
state participation in and responsibility for the private acts of racial
discrimination was far more significant and authoritative.
"Principled" decision-making would have warranted the ascertain-
ment and articulation of specific judicial standards and guidelines regard-
ing the nature and extent of the state's participation in the particular
acts of private discrimination. In Mulkey, however, the California Su-
preme Court could only generalize regarding state responsibility. The
Court did not closely analyze and scrutinize the purpose and necessary
operational effect of Section 26 in light of an existing widespread com-
munity custom of residential segregation. In the absence of this more
comprehensive examination of the conditions surrounding the adoption
and application of the provision, the Court's finding that Section 26
"authorizes" and "encourages" discrimination appears conclusionary,
a mere assumption. The Court seems to acknowledge that the state has
no duty to affirmatively prohibit private discrimination; yet it implies
that once a state does enact such legislation, any official affirmative
retreat therefrom necessarily constitutes state action "encouraging" pri-
vate discrimination. 29
129 Compare Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer:Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 473, 483 (1962):
The voting cases have suggested . . . that the state continues to be responsible for discrimination
where it once sought to regulate private activity and later seeks to disengage itzelf. . . If a state
continues to be responsible after it repeals invalid discriminatory regulation . . . it would seem re-
sponsible, a fortiori when it repeals state legislation in order to make it "lawful" for private persons
to discriminate.
But can such an analysis be applied to Section 26, which did not deal with private activity in
a qausi-public function, in the absence of certain and specific proof of the purpose and effect
of that provision? Cf. Hill v. Miller, 64 Adv.Cal. 819, 51 CaJ.Rptr. 689 (1966).
[Vol. I
RESIDENTIAL RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
Perhaps, ultimately, the United States Supreme Court will broadly
expand the concept of "state action." Perhaps the Court will extend the
"affirmative duty" cases, Shelley v. Kraemer, Evans v. Newton and
Griffin v. Maryland to recognize that all private racial discrimination
occurs in a context of state participation; that states, through permissive-
ness, inaction and omission, are therefore significantly responsible for all
private discrimination. But, the Court has not authoritatively developed
such an approach as of yet. A realistic inquiry into the qualitative nature
and quantitative extent of the states' involvement in the act of private
bias is still required. "Principled" decision-making demands a compre-
hensive and disciplined factual analysis of each case, not a mere repetition
of nebulous generalizations regarding the significance of state partici-
pation.
Unfortunately, the California Supreme Court's unrestricted reading
of the "affirmative duty-public function" cases and Shelley v. Kraemer
could lead to the abolition of the state action-private action distinction.
Any private individual who is the victim of racially discriminatory treat-
ment perpetrated by another private individual need only file suit for
affirmative judicial relief in order to "make a federal case out of it."
For if the state Court refuses relief, it becomes a participant in the dis-
crimination. The commands of the equal protection clause may then
apply to prohibit all private, as well as public, acts of racial discrimina-
tion except on those, rare occasions where the "defense" of freedom from
compelled association might be appropriate. In the latter case, the
Court will be forced to balance important associational freedoms against
the prohibition on the particular act of private racial discrimination.
Therefore, while a decision condemning private racial discrimination
is both appealing and desirable from a result-oriented point of view, we
must ask whether the ultimate abolition of the Fourteenth Amendment's
"state action" requirement could cause greater problems. Does preser-
vation of a realistic concept of state action serve any important societal
purpose?
Mr. Justice Harlan has stated:
This [state action] limitation on the scope of the prohibitions of the
Fourteenth Amendment serves several vital functions in our system.
Underlying the cases involving an alleged denial of equal protection by
ostensibly private action is a clash of competing constitutional claims
of a high order: liberty and equality. Freedom of the individual to
choose his associates or his neighbors, to use and dispose of his property
as he sees fit, to be irrational, arbitrary, capricious, even unjust in his
personal relations are things all entitled to a large measure of protection
from governmental interference. This liberty would be overridden, in
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the name of equality, if the strictures of the Amendment were applied
to governmental and private action without distinction. Also inherent
in the concept of state action are values of federalism, a recognition
that there are areas of private rights upon which federal power should
not lay a heavy hand and which should properly be left to the more
precise instruments of local authority.'" [Emphasis added I
The United States Supreme Court continues to expressly recognize
the need for significant and responsible state participation as a pre-
requisite for applying the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment to
private acts of racial discrimination. Unless and until the Court rejects
this notion and broadly expands the sphere of state responsibility, lower
courts and legal commentators must observe and intelligently analyze
allegations of "state action" or state participation in private acts of
racial discrimination. Judicial decisions dealing with such problems must
be based upon objective (rather than result-oriented) considerations. In
order to meaningfully distinguish permissive, neutral state laws from
those that encourage private discrimination, courts must undertake an
in-depth and comprehensive examination of the provision, its purpose,
application and operation in light of community environment, expecta-
tions and practices. To be "generally principled," decisions must not look
merely to the wording of an innocuously and neutrally phrased enactment
and simply conclude, without underlying factual support, that the pro-
vision does or does not encourage private bias. For in so approaching this
important problem, courts could too easily subvert the true policy of
the Fourteenth Amendment. An overly narrow view of state responsi-
bility could result in judicial affirmation of publicly encouraged racial
discrimination; an overly expansive interpretation could convert all
private discrimination into state action. Either extreme would seem to
conflict with the clear meaning and purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment and its equal protection clause. In this area of law, desirable results
and personal predilections, whether bigoted or enlightened should not
control judicial decision making. Mr. Justice Black has cautioned us to
"remember that it is a Constitution and that it is our duty 'to bow with
respectful submission to its provisions'."
Our duty is simply to interpret the Constitution and in doing so the
test of constitutionality is not whether a law is offensive to our con-
science or to the 'good old common law', but whether it is offensive to
the Constitution.33 1
1 30 peterson v. City of Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 249-250 (1963) (concurring opinion),
cited by Mr. Justice White in dissenting from the Mulkey decision, 64 Adv.Cal. at 578; 50
Cal.Rptr. at 894-895.
131 Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 341-342 (1964) (dissenting opinion), citing Cohens v.




The result reached by the California Supreme Court in Mulkey v. Reit-
man was the correct one. Article I, Section 26 of the California Con-
stitution was state action violative of the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. For the constitutional lawyer, however, this
conclusion must not be based upon the mere desirability of the immedi-
ate result (i.e., condemnation of private racial discrimination). To be
principled the decision must incisively appraise the true nature of the
state's participation in the specific acts of private discrimination. Platti-
tudes and eloquent rhetoric cannot substitute for analytical application
of uniform, objective standards for measuring state responsibility.
It is not enough to summarily invalidate official enactments as vio-
lative of the Fourteenth Amendment and then support this conclusion
with the quotation of language and citation of precedents of questionable
relevance. Smith v. Allwright, Shelley v. Kraemer, Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority and Evans v. Newton, in spite of the generally noble
language they contain, are not factually similar to the California resi-
dential segregation problem and should not have been used by the Mulkey
court as controlling authority. Mulkey simply did not involve the type
of state participation found in any of those cases. The result in Mulkey
is constitutionally sound on a narrower basis. Article I, Section 26 violates
equal protection because it was an affirmative enactment which rein-
forced a community custom of residential segregation.
This does not mean that all private racial discrimination necessarily
violates the Fourteenth Amendment. The California Supreme Court has
recently recognized this." 2 Private discrimination which occurs in the
context of true state silence violates no federal right of the victim of the
discriminatory treatment. But Article I, Section 26 of the California Con-
stitution could not be considered the equivalent of state silence. It was
an official enactment (clear state action) which affirmatively sanctioned
acts of private racial discrimination in the alienation of residential prop-
erty. In light of the prior tradition and custom of residential de facto
segregation, and the clear racial purpose which motivated the adoption
of the provision, 3 3 Section 26 operated so as to necessarily encourage
discriminatory practices. The property owners' decision whether to dis-
criminate or not to discriminate, then, was made against a background
of an official endorsement of the customary community pressures which
encourage residential segregation.
132 Hill v. Miller, 64 Adv.Cal. 819, 51 Cal.Rptr. 689 (1966).
133 See note 53 and accompanying text, supra.
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Therefore, I can agree that the Fourteenth Amendment is not vio-
lated by purely private discriminatory choices made in the context of
true state silence and neutrality on the matter; equal protection of laws
is denied, however, by state pronouncements (even though innocuous on
their face) which operate to affirmatively encourage and endorse the
private discriminatory practice.
